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The Sixth International Conference on Corporate Governance in Emerging  
Markets is part of a series of academic events organized by the Emerging Markets 
Corporate Governance Network (EMCGN). The IFC Corporate Governance Group 
endorses and supports the Network, which was first convened by Stijn Claessens 
in 2001. The biannual academic conferences focus on themes that are important 
to academics and practitioners interested in the role and effect of corporate  
governance in emerging markets. The Sixth Conference was co-organized by  
EMCGN and the Institute of Governance and Organizational Responsibility at 
Groningen University and hosted by de Nederlandsche Bank, with support from NN Investment Partners and  
European Investment Bank.
In keeping with the Network’s tradition, the conference included a keynote lecture and a plenary session where  
two papers were presented. The keynote speaker was Simeon Djankov, a member of the Network’s Scientific 
Committee. Presenters of the two papers were Asaf Hamdani and Yishay Yafeh, also a member of the Network’s 
Scientific Committee. The conference concluded with a panel discussion on a contested subject by governance  
practitioners: Implementing E (environmental), S (social), and G (governance) in Emerging Markets.
The conference included 23 papers by scholars from 19 countries. The papers, presented in seven thematically differ-
ent sessions, explored recurring issues in corporate governance research, such as governance in family-controlled 
firms, governance of financial institutions, and related-party transactions in controlled firms, as well as less studied 
topics, such as the effect of board gender quotas on firm performance in an emerging-market context. 
Sixth International Research Conference on  
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets
Day One
Following opening remarks from Conference Chair Kees 
van Veen (University of Groningen) and Stijn Claessens 
(EMCGN Chair, Bank for International Settlements, and 
University of Amsterdam), the latter presented the evolution 
of the Emerging Markets Corporate Governance Research 
Network. He reminded attendees that the Network’s prima-
ry purpose is to stimulate research on corporate governance 
in emerging markets as well as in transition and developing 
countries, with the objective of raising the academic quality 
of research, fostering international exchange among schol-
ars in all regions, and enhancing the dialogue of research- Stijn Claessens
Background
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channel of value diversion, which they label indirect tun-
neling, and set it apart from other forms of value diversion. 
They also show that insiders’ ownership of other significant 
businesses—and not just the wedge between their cash flow 
rights and voting rights—is an important source of agency 
costs. Furthermore, they argue that indirect tunneling can-
not be eliminated by adopting new rules against self-dealing 
or by strengthening the enforcement of existing rules. Thus 
they reject the common view that a strong anti-self-dealing 
regime is sufficient to protect investors from value diversion. 
Lawmakers interested in limiting insiders’ private benefits  
of control should consider other measures: expanding  
disclosure rules or structural remedies, such as limiting the 
scope of business groups. 
Discussant Julan Du (Chinese University of Hong Kong) 
addressed the relevance and implications of this paper 
from two perspectives: 1) the rising popularity of dual-class 
share structure in emerging markets and 2) state capitalism 
and relationship-based business models in some emerging 
markets and particularly in China. The reciprocal favor 
exchanges that contribute to indirect tunneling through a 
third party could be a big concern when non-state- 
controlled companies need to build and maintain political 
connections. The externalization of benefits for this could 
be highly relevant.
Session A1 on “Family Governance,” chaired by Halit 
Gonenc (University of Groningen) 
First A1 paper: “Family Monitoring the Family,” by Joseph 
P. H. Fan and Xin Yu (presenter). The authors examined 
how founding-family participation in firm ownership and 
management shapes related-party transactions in more than 
1,200 Chinese publicly traded private sector firms. They 
found that firms with more family-member participation 
engage in fewer abnormal related-party transactions that 
are suspicious with regard to expropriation; this suggests 
a potential monitoring role by a firm’s founding family 
members. Such effects are stronger in stocks that are thinly 
traded and followed by few analysts, which suggests an 
effect of family governance substituting for weak market 
governance. Moreover, seniority and closeness of family 
relationships matter to the strength of family monitoring: 
family monitoring effects are stronger when more senior 
ers with policymakers and the private sector. Addressing 
areas that require continuing attention from researchers, 
Claessens listed the need for careful documentation of 
ownership and control structures and their effects on firms’ 
performance and valuation; the value of analysis on the 
composition and role of the board of directors, including 
the effects of dominant shareholders; greater attention to 
CSR (corporate social responsibility) issues; and the need 
to assess the roles of legal structure and enforcement when 
analyzing corporate governance around the world.
Plenary Session
Following the opening remarks, Kees van Veen chaired a 
plenary session for the presentation of two papers.
First plenary paper: “The Effect of Minority Veto Rights 
on Controller Tunneling,” by Jesse M. Fried, Ehud Kamar, 
and Yishay Yafeh (presenter). A central challenge in the 
regulation of controlled firms is curbing controller tunnel-
ing. Because independent directors and fiduciary duties are 
widely seen as not up to this task, a number of jurisdictions 
have given minority shareholders veto rights over these 
transactions. To assess the efficacy of these rights, they 
make use of a 2011 regulatory reform in Israel that gave 
the minority the ability to veto pay packages of controllers 
and their relatives (“controller executives”). The authors 
found that the reform curbed the pay of controller exec-
utives and led some to quit their jobs or work for free in 
circumstances suggesting their pay would not have received 
approval. These findings suggest that minority veto rights 
can help curb controller tunneling. 
Discussant Stijn Claessens acknowledged the importance of 
the research question and highlighted both the strength of 
the analysis and its relevance for policymakers. At the same 
time, he suggested that there be greater focus on a broader 
picture, since executive pay constitutes only one form of 
tunneling, and since controllers may switch to other tunnel-
ing mechanisms after the reform.
Second plenary paper: “The Agency Costs of Controlling 
Shareholders,” by Lucian A. Bebchuk, and Assaf Hamdani 
(presenter). The authors offer a new understanding of the 
agency costs underlying controlled companies. They chal-
lenge the pervasive view that self-dealing is the principal 
channel for minority expropriation, and they identify a new 
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has instituted gender quotas on corporate boards. Using 
a dataset of 10,218 firm-year observations from 2005 to 
2014, which spans the pre-quota and post-quota years, they 
found robust evidence that women directors on corporate 
boards have a positive impact on firm value, and that this 
effect increases with the number of women directors on 
the board. However, the positive effect of gender diversity 
on firm performance weakens with the extent to which 
the family exerts control through occupying key manage-
ment positions on the board. Moreover, women directors 
affiliated with the family have no significant effect on firm 
value, whereas independent women directors do. Turning to 
accounting profitability, the results are somewhat different: 
women directors have a positive impact on profitability, 
with the positive effect driven by independent women  
directors; however, the effect does not vary with the extent 
of family control. Taken together, this evidence suggests 
that, although gender diversity on corporate boards may 
positively influence firm performance in family firms in 
general, the extent of family control can have a significant 
bearing on this relationship. 
Discussant Melsa Ararat (Sabanci University) suggested that 
the authors could focus the inquiry on  the outcome of gen-
der quotas in India and simplify the presentation of their 
empirical analysis by highlighting a smaller subset of them 
relevant to the research focus and noted the valuable contri-
bution of studying quota effects in emerging economies. 
Session A2 on “Governance and Finance,” chaired by  
Stijn Claessens 
First A2 paper: “Predicting the Risk of Financial Distress 
using Corporate Governance Measures,” by Zhiyong Li 
(presenter), Jonathan Crook, Galina Andreeva, and Ying 
Tang. Using a dynamic discrete-time survival analysis 
model, the authors sought to contribute to the literature on 
financial stability by assessing the effectiveness of aspects of 
corporate governance for predicting financial distress. The 
model includes various corporate governance measures, fi-
nancial ratios, and macroeconomic variables in a panel data 
structure over a 10-year period. Furthermore, the paper 
addresses the association of government ownership with 
the risk of financial distress in China. The results suggest 
that, although corporate governance alone is not sufficient 
or distantly related family members participate in the firms 
and weaker when more children of the founders participate. 
The role of family members as owners and/or managers 
also matters: shareholding family managers are associated 
with fewer suspicious related-party transactions than are 
family managers without shares and family owners who do 
not act as managers. Overall, this study’s evidence supports 
the view that the checks and balances among founding 
family members benefit public investors, particularly when 
market governance is weak in enforcing investor rights.
Discussant Burcin Yurtoglu (WHU), while questioning the 
validity of some of the measures used and suggesting some 
more powerful tests, argued that the paper makes an im-
portant contribution to a better understanding of the role 
of family members in family firms’ governance. 
Second A1 paper: “Family Firms, Directors’ Remuneration, 
Ownership Concentration, Expropriation, and Firm Value: 
Evidence from Malaysia,” by Liew Chee Yoong (presenter), 
Young Kyung-Ko, Song Bee Lian, and Saraniah Thechina 
Murthy. The authors studied the effects of directors’ re-
muneration on firm value and whether ownership concen-
tration moderates these effects. They report that executive 
directors’ remuneration increases firm value in both family 
and non-family firms and that this association is stronger in 
non-family firms as compared with family firms. They also 
found that non-executive directors’ remuneration increases 
firm value in family firms; however, they found no evidence 
that this association is stronger in family firms than in 
non-family firms. 
Discussant Egle Karmaziene (University of Groningen) 
suggested that endogeneity issues should be considered 
further in the paper and that the paper could benefit from 
a more focused approach. He also suggested that it would 
be useful for the authors to discuss the external validity of 
their results. 
Third A1 paper: “Women on Boards and Performance of 
Family Firms: Evidence from India,” by Jayati Sarkar (pre-
senter) and Ekta Selarka. The authors analyzed the effect 
of women directors on the performance of family firms. 
They used a case study of a firm in India, which provides 
an ideal setting for investigating this topic, as the presence 
of family firms is pervasive there and, since 2013, India 
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findings that PE funding leads to operational efficiency: 
 both labor productivity and total factor productivity 
improve as PE-backed companies ramp up investment, 
employment, and sales. Using detailed confidential informa-
tion obtained from inside PE firms, the authors show that 
the PE firms in their sample push for operational improve-
ments, and that these improvements are the main drivers 
of the returns investors receive from PE funds. They note 
that there is no evidence that PE-backed companies increase 
their market power. In fact, the PE-backed companies re-
duce their price markups by 6 percent on average.
Discussant Ling Yew Hua Lynn (Curtin University) noted 
that inferences made based on the applied methodology 
and sensitivity analysis are robust and valid, but it would  
be useful to include clarification on decision makers on pri-
vate equity investment and an explanation on how private 
equity investment is performed. 
Session B1 on “Agency Costs,” chaired by Niels Hermes 
(University of Groningen) 
First B1 paper: “Does Regulatory Reform of Cumula-
tive Voting Improve Minority Shareholder Protection?” 
by Yinghui Chen and Julan Du (presenter). The study 
addressed whether cumulative voting (CV) can elevate 
board representation of large minority shareholders and 
improve corporate governance in the presence of dominant 
shareholders. Using hand-collected director-level data, the 
authors conducted a differences-in-differences analysis 
of China’s CV reform. They found that non-controlling 
substantial shareholders cooperate in voting to raise their 
board representation, especially in a subsample whose top 
10 shareholders are unrelated. CV enhances the “disinter-
estedness” of outside directors. CV-elected directors have 
better professional and educational qualifications. CV 
firms without related top-10 shareholders display higher 
Tobin’s q and market-to-book ratio. However, the mar-
ginal improvements are insufficient to improve accounting 
performances.
Discussant Xin Yu (University of Queensland) noted that 
election of candidates through CV does not necessarily 
lead to general improvement for minority shareholders, 
because it could be a result of power balance between the 
controlling owners and non-controlling substantial share-
to accurately predict financial distress and hence financial 
stability, it adds to the predictive power of financial ratios 
and macroeconomic factors. In addition, the model pro-
vides insights into the role of state ownership, independent 
directors, and some personal characteristics of the chair/
CEO. 
Discussant Ralph De Haas (EBRD) suggested that the au-
thors try to be explicit about the causality between corpo-
rate governance and financial distress and that they include 
in their models the channels through which the causal 
relation works.
Second A2 paper: “Corporate Governance in European 
Banks: Institutional Investors Follow, Returns Don’t,” by 
Anastasia Stepanova and Olga Ivantsova (presenter). The 
paper focuses on potential reverse causality between good 
governance and institutional ownership. Using data from 
172 European public banks over 2004–2016, the authors 
studied the relationship between institutional ownership 
and corporate governance—a useful setting because of the 
better disclosure practices and special attention to the gov-
ernance in banking. They show that institutional investors 
prefer to invest in banks that already have “good” corpo-
rate governance. Although their primary target is supposed 
to be return generation, market returns do not always 
follow “good” corporate governance and sometimes even 
do quite the opposite.
Discussant Gunseli Tumer (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) 
mentioned that the paper would benefit from improving 
the methodological approach in terms of identification. She 
noted that the paper tackles an important issue in corporate 
governance, namely investment choices and investment 
returns, and the authors should reconsider the definition of 
good corporate governance and include further discussion 
of the tradeoffs mentioned in the paper to strengthen the 
motivation.
Third A2 paper: “The Effects of Private Equity on Opera-
tional Efficiency and Market Power,” by Markus Biesinger 
(presenter), Çağatay Bircan, and Alexander Ljungqvist. 
The authors studied how private equity (PE) firms generate 
returns for their investors, by estimating the effects of PE 
funding on portfolio companies’ operational efficiency and 
market power. They suggest that the paper confirms prior 
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structures and holding companies as large shareholders are 
very common in the region, suggesting potential conflicts of 
interest between majority and minority shareholders. The 
authors also observed differences among financial and non-
financial firms, with nonfinancial firms having more con-
centrated ownership structures. The state is the controlling 
shareholder in the vast majority of financial and nonfinan-
cial firms, and the presence of the state as first among the 
largest shareholders is positively related to firm size as 
measured in market capitalization and total assets. There 
are also differences across countries: ownership concentra-
tion in financial firms from Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates is higher compared with those from 
Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. The importance of families as 
largest shareholders varies significantly between countries, 
with Qatar exhibiting the lowest proportion and the United 
Arab Emirates the highest proportion of family ownership. 
Also, the importance of the state as the major shareholder is 
particularly visible in Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates. Pyramid ownership structures are common only 
in Kuwait, and cross-holdings structures are mainly used in 
the United Arab Emirates. These results suggest that the di-
versity of the institutional context across countries is related 
to particular characteristics in ownership concentration and 
shareholder identity.
Discussant Yan Zhang (Asian Development Bank Institute) 
commended the authors for the good dataset they used. 
Noting the higher concentration of ownership in oil-rich 
industries as shown in the findings, she suggested that the 
authors provide more information about the markets and 
regulations by citing prior literature and that they discuss 
the policy implications. She further noted that the paper 
needs more identifications on the relationship between 
ownership structure and country characteristics to specify 
causality beyond correlation.
Session B2 on “Managerial Entrenchment,” chaired  
by Burcin Yurtoglu (WHU—Otto Beisheim School of 
Management) 
First B2 paper: “Investment and Agency Motives of 
Corporate Philanthropy: Evidence from Anti-Dumping 
Initiations,” by Shantanu Banerjeea, Aurélie Slechtena, 
and Swarnodeep Homroy (presenter). This paper analyzes 
holders. She suggested that the authors investigate whether 
CV implementation has any significant effects on corporate 
policies on tunneling, levels of executive compensation, and 
capital structure. She also suggested the authors examine 
earnings quality, which provides more direct evidence of 
improved corporate governance.
Second B1 paper: “The Inner Workings of the Board: 
Evidence from Emerging Markets,” by Ralph De Haas 
(presenter), Daniel Ferreira, and Tom Kirchmaier. This 
paper presents the results from a survey of non-executive 
directors in emerging markets, which contains detailed 
information about the inner workings of corporate boards 
across a variety of institutional settings. The paper docu-
ments substantial variation in the structure and conduct of 
boards as well as in directors’ perceptions of the local legal 
environment. Further analysis shows that directors who feel 
adequately empowered by local legislation are less likely 
to actively vote against board proposals. They also form 
boards that play a stronger role in the company’s strategic 
decision making. This suggests that a supportive legal envi-
ronment allows directors to focus more on their advisory 
role, as opposed to their monitoring role.
Discussant Yishay Yafeh (Hebrew University) highlighted 
the ambiguities in the literature on corporate boards and 
thus the importance of this research question. At the same 
time, he questioned how representative the sample was, 
the response rate to the survey, and the subjective nature of 
some of the survey questions. He also drew attention to the 
role that Russian firms play in the survey. Most important-
ly, he recommended that the authors focus more on how 
their survey results can inform the discourse on the role of 
boards in general.
Third B1 paper: “Ownership Concentration in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council,” by Irma Martínez-García, Narjess 
Boubakri, Silvia Gómez-Ansón, and Rodrigo Basco 
(presenter). The authors reported on a study of ownership 
concentration and control of 692 firms listed on the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) stock markets over the period 
2009–2015. The results show that ownership structure is 
highly concentrated in GCC corporations, with the large 
majority of the corporations controlled by the state or 
families. While cross-country differences exist, pyramid 
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following the reforms. Overall, the results suggest that the 
implementation of mandatory RPT disclosure rules can be 
effective in decreasing tunneling and increasing minority 
valuations in an emerging market.
Discussant Bert Scholtens (University of Groningen) 
suggested that the authors should clarify whether the law 
was unexpected, think about alternative explanations for 
performance differences, and discuss selection bias. 
Third B2 paper: “Dividends and Underinvestment in 
China: Did Foreign Investors Export Liquidity during 
the Global Financial Crisis?” by John Goodell, Abhinav 
Goyal (presenter), and Wei Huang. The authors studied 
the international flow of liquidity between regions with dif-
ferent levels of temporary financial constraints. Examining 
approximately 18,000 firm-years from China, they found 
that foreign controlling ownership of Chinese firms was 
associated with extraordinary increase in dividend payouts 
during the 2007–2009 global financial crisi s, with concom-
itant underinvestment. This evidence is robust to a matched 
sample of domestically controlled firms selected using pro-
pensity-score matching, as well as to an alternative control 
sample of firms invested in by Qualified Foreign Institu-
tional Investors. The authors interpret these results as not 
due to a general clientele effect, but rather suggesting that 
foreign controlling shareholders in China acted specifically 
to expropriate (export) liquidity through dividends.
Discussant Marc Deloof (University of Antwerp) suggested 
that the hypothesis development could be tightened up by 
differentiating foreign investors from foreign controllers 
and exploring the heterogeneity in controlling owners. 
Keynote Address: “The Future of Work in Emerging  
Markets: Governance and Finance Challenges,” by Simeon 
Djankov (Executive Director, Financial Markets Group  
Research Center, LSE; former Minister of Finance, Bulgaria) 
Using results from the forthcoming World Development 
Report (2019), Simeon Djankov focused on how the nature 
of work is changing as a result of advances in technology. 
While technology improves overall living standards, he said, 
the process can be disruptive, and a new social contract is 
needed to smooth the transition and guard against rising 
inequality. As a first priority, significant investments in hu-
the effect of exposure to foreign stakeholders on corporate 
philanthropy of domestic firms. The authors took an inno-
vative approach, placing their research within the view of 
corporate philanthropy as investment in long-term reputa-
tion as opposed to the perspective of corporate philanthropy 
as agency motive of private benefits for managers. Using 
the method of natural experiment, they measured the effect 
of exogenous changes in exposure to consumer preference 
for corporate philanthropy and showed that expenditures 
for corporate philanthropy are in response to investment 
opportunities in the export market. The authors examined 
philanthropic expenses of Indian firms when competing 
with Chinese products that are subject to anti-dumping 
petitions. Conditional on exporting, Indian firms increase 
philanthropic expenses when anti-dumping is initiated by 
the United States and the European Union, but they do 
not do so when shocks originate from markets with low 
stakeholder preference for corporate philanthropy. Capital 
investments and R&D increase in response to such demand 
shocks, irrespective of their country of origin. Collectively, 
these results provide empirical evidence of investment mo-
tives for corporate philanthropy.
Discussant Maria Aluchna (Warsaw School of Economics) 
noted that spending on corporate philanthropy seems to be 
in reaction to investment opportunities in the export mar-
ket, and if corporate philanthropy were driven mainly by 
agency motives, then increased spending on it would occur 
regardless of the origin of the shock and would be relatively 
stronger for unaffiliated firms.
Second B2 paper: “The Market Reaction to Changes in 
Disclosure of Related-Party Transaction Rules,” by Vladi-
mir Atanasov, Adrian Pop, and Diana Pop (presenter). The 
authors studied the valuation effects of the 2004 changes in 
Romanian related-party transactions (RPT) disclosure rules. 
Because the rule changes apply only to companies listed 
on the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE), companies traded 
on an alternative market (RASDAQ) served as a natural 
control group. They found that, immediately following 
the adoption of the rules, BSE firms experienced abnormal 
returns of 6 percent to 12 percent relative to matched RAS-
DAQ firms with similar pre-reform characteristics. They 
also found that BSE firms experience a 20 percent to 25 
percent increase in their Tobin’s q in the three-year period 
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Implications,” by Ling Yew Hua Lynn (presenter), John 
Evans  and Md Shibley Sadique. The paper presented 
an analysis of the effect of family directors and indepen-
dent directors on family firms’ value, within the context 
of corporate acquisitions in Malaysia. Based on their 
study of a sample of 267 corporate acquisitions made by 
publicly listed Malaysian family firms over the 10-year 
period of 2002–2011, the authors suggest that a balance 
of power between family representatives and independent 
directors on the board should be encouraged as one of 
the best practices of corporate governance in Malaysian 
family firms. This recommendation is based on findings 
that include a positive valuation effect of family directors 
on the board (relative to independent directors) to family 
firm value. 
Discussant Zhiyong Li (School of Finance, Southwestern 
University of Finance and Economics) applauded the re-
searchers for the good application of the event study and 
suggested that the authors should try to understand and 
explain the mechanisms behind the nonlinear relationship 
between the ratio of family directors to independent direc-
tors and valuation, beyond intitutions.
Second C1 paper: “Performance and Abilities of Fami-
ly-Member CEOs in a Context of Formal Institutional 
Weakness,” by Karen Watkins-Fassler (presenter), Gua-
dalupe del Carmen Briano-Turrent, and Lázaro Rodrí-
guez-Ariza. The authors studied the relationship between 
the abilities of family-member CEOs and the financial 
performance of listed family companies. Using a sample 
of nonfinancial family firms listed on the Mexican Stock 
Exchange during the period 2001–2014, they found that 
better corporate financial outcomes are achieved with ex-
ternal CEOs rather than with family-member CEOs, even 
when their abilities, specifically experience and academic 
background, are similar. They also found that the inverse 
relationship between family-member CEOs and financial 
performance is moderated when the CEOs had a strong 
business-related academic background that enabled them 
to acquire the skills and greater perspective needed to 
cope with the higher transaction costs and increased busi-
ness risks present in environments of formal institutional 
weakness, as is the case in Mexico.
man capital throughout a person’s lifecycle are vital to this 
effort. If workers are to stay competitive against machines, 
they need to be able to retool existing skills or be better 
trained from the start. In addition to investments in human 
capital, the changing nature of work demands updates to 
social protection systems. Traditional provisions of social 
protection—based on steady wage employment, clear defi-
nitions of employers and employees, and a fixed point of re-
tirement—become increasingly obsolete. Improved private 
sector policies to encourage start-up activity and competi-
tion can also help countries compete in the digital age.
Djankov also said that governments will need additional 
revenues to fund the investments demanded by the  
changing nature of work. Governments can create fiscal 
space through a mix of additional revenues from existing 
taxes (increases in rates or widening of the tax base), the 
introduction of new taxes, and improvements in tax  
administration.
Day Two
The second day of the conference started with two parallel 
sessions. 
Session C1 on “Family Control,” chaired by Yishay Yafeh 
(Hebrew University)
First C1 paper: “Family Directors and Independent  
Directors of Malaysian Public-Listed Family Firms: From 
the Perspective of Corporate Acquisitions and its Policy 
Simeon Djankov
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tration, diversity, and identity (foreign ownership, local 
ownership, state ownership, and free float). In a sample of 
94 indexed companies from six European frontier markets 
during 2005–2016, a panel data analysis suggests that own-
ership concentration has a significant positive impact on the 
market performance of the firms. Ownership diversity and 
market performance are negatively associated. Moreover, 
the authors found that local ownership has a significantly 
positive relationship with the firms’ market performance. 
Discussant Naciye Sekerci (Utrecht University School of 
Economics) suggested that the authors should discuss why 
the relationship between ownership and firm performance 
would be different in frontier markets. She also suggested 
that, if concentration of ownership is a response to weak 
institutional environment, a conditional analysis may be 
useful. 
Second C2 paper: “Pyramidal Ownership and Company 
Value. The Evidence from Polish Listed Companies,” 
by Maria Aluchna (presenter), Tomasz Kuszewski, and 
Tomasz Zaton´. The authors investigated the effects of 
pyramidal structures on company value in Poland, noting 
that the link between pyramidal ownership and firm value 
is complex. Using a sample of 181 nonfinancial companies 
listed in years 2010–2014 on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, 
the authors examined the link between the control by a 
pyramid and firm value measured by Tobin’s q. Specifically, 
the empirical analysis focused on the effect of pyramidal 
ownership by a majority owner as well as pyramidal own-
ership by a shareholder coalition. The results indicate that 
the use of pyramids is associated with lower q. In addition, 
while the adoption of a pyramid by a coalition of owners 
destroys firm value, the adoption of a pyramid by a ma-
jority shareholder increases q. The results show that, while 
pyramidal ownership by a shareholder coalition strengthens 
the separation of cash flow and control rights and decreases 
firm value, concentrated ownership adds to the monitoring 
by dominant shareholders and offsets the negative effect, 
thus improving firm value.
Third C2 paper: “Internal Capital Market Mergers in 
Weak External Market Environment: The Case of Chi-
na,” by Wei Huang and Abhinav Goyal and Hong Zhang 
(presenter). The authors set out to reevaluate the competing 
Discussant Olga Ivantsova (National Research University 
Higher School of Economics) raised the question of wheth-
er the better results of the firms with the external CEOs 
could be explained by their greater motivation to keep their 
position and reputation. Family-member CEOs would not 
lose their position in the family (and probably their share in 
the business) even in the event of bad results. She suggested 
that it would be interesting to compare the results with data 
from other countries where family-ownership was also very 
strong.
Third C1 paper: “Family Control and Firm Innovation: 
Evidence from the Chinese SME Board,” by Jingjing Xu 
and Yan Zhang (presenter). The authors investigated the 
impact of family control on firm-level innovation, using 
data from the Chinese SME (small and medium enterprise) 
Board. They report that family firms invest less in innova-
tion compared with other firms in the Chinese SME Board. 
Further, family-member CEOs have no significant effect 
on innovation, whereas family dominance in the board 
of directors shows a significant negative influence on a 
firm’s innovation, and this effect is stronger when the firm’s 
founder is in a key position, or the family’s cash flow right 
in the firm is higher.
Discussant Liew Chee Yoong (SEGi University) suggested 
that there’s a need for clarification on the methodology and 
further refinement of the theoretical underpinning. He also 
suggested that the authors should think about and discuss 
the implications of their findings for family firm governance 
in general.
Session C2 on “Ownership Structure,” chaired by by 
Melsa Ararat (Sabanci University Corporate Governance 
Forum) 
This session’s three papers looked at different aspects of 
ownership structure, each with a different geographic focus.
First C2 paper: “Investigations of the European Frontier 
Markets: Ownership Composition and Financial Perfor-
mance,” by R. M. Ammar Zahid (presenter), Alina Taran, 
and Can Simga-Mugan. The authors studied the link 
between ownership composition and financial performance 
of listed companies from European frontier markets. They 
considered three aspects of ownership composition: concen-
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board size, higher qualifications, longer tenure, and more 
outside affiliations. They also found no decrease in long-run 
valuation and profitability. Interestingly, the paper reports 
a decline in reporting quality, despite an improvement in 
accounting quality, without any significant changes in the 
audit effort.
Discussant Subrata Sarkar (Indira Gandhi Institute of 
Development Research) suggested that the paper could be 
strengthened by incorporating the difference in the type of 
women directors that are added to the board, namely inde-
pendent or gray. Many emerging economies, like India, are 
dominated by family firms, and companies often appoint 
family members to the board to comply with the regula-
tions— perhaps not the intention of these regulations. Thus 
the analysis can look into family and non-family firms, 
and within each group the effect of independent and gray 
women directors.
Second C3 paper: “Board Interlocks with Shell Companies 
and Firm Value: Evidence from Director Disqualifications 
in India,” by Ajay Bhaskarabhatla (presenter) and Rajani 
Singh. The paper exploits an unprecedented and unex-
pected public enforcement activity in India in September 
2017 that led to the identification of 200,000 shell com-
panies and 300,000 directors serving on their boards. By 
showing that board interlocks with these shells lower firm 
performance before interlocks are publicly disclosed, the 
paper implicates the quality of corporate governance at the 
interlocked firms rather than the decline in reputation that 
typically follows such disclosures. These results are robust 
across cross-sectional, instrumental variables, and longitu-
dinal fixed-effects regression analyses.
Discussant Jana Oehmichen (University of Groningen) ap-
plauded the paper for its robustness and its highlighting of 
an interesting phenomenon. She suggested that the mecha-
nism of the negative performance effect of board interlocks 
with shell companies can be further explored by making 
more use of the panel data and exploring the effect of other 
dependent variables.
Third C3 paper: “Non-Executive Directors: The Role of 
Risk Management in Controlling Capital Expenditures,” 
by Anh Tho To (presenter), Yoshihisa Suzuki, Thi Thu 
Hong Ho, Thi Siem Tran, and Quoc Tuan Tran. Using 
views of internal capital markets (ICMs), using China’s 
Split-Share Structure Reform (SSSR) as a regulatory shock 
in the market to study merger deals completed within a 
dominant form of ICMs in China—related parties. They 
conducted a battery of difference-in-differences tests and 
documented a significant and positive treatment effect 
of the SSSR on related-party mergers and acquisitions 
(RPMA), as compared with non-RPMAs, measured by 
acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns around deal an-
nouncements. This treatment effect is particularly strong 
for deals undertaken by acquirers with low mutual-fund 
ownership, indicating benefits of the reform for weakly 
governed firms. Unlike prior findings that generally hold a 
negative view of related-party transactions, this study sug-
gests how major policy reforms in emerging-market settings 
can reduce abusive related-party transactions associated 
with managerial entrenchment and tunneling, resulting in 
value gains through ICM transactions.
Discussant Çağatay Bircan (European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development) suggested that the paper could 
be strengthened by providing a more in-depth discussion of 
how internal capital markets are leveraged to improve cor-
porate governance following the SSSR. He noted that the 
underlying mechanisms are crucial to understanding how 
related-party transactions can be a positive tool in improv-
ing company performance.
Session C3 on “Corporate Board,” chaired Julan Du  
(Chinese University of Hong Kong) 
This session’s three papers looked at different aspects of 
boards. 
First C3 paper: “Efficacy and Consequences of Indian 
Board Gender Quota Law,” by Shibashish Mukherjee 
(presenter) and Yasemin Karaibrahimoglu. The authors 
examined the efficacy and consequences of the Indian 
gender-quota provision of the Companies Act of 2013, 
a reform that prescribed at least one woman director 
per board for all listed firms. The authors argue that the 
new Quota Law was instrumental in impairing men-only 
homogeneity by significantly increasing gender diversity on 
Indian boards. They note that this has resulted in desir-
able board-configuration outcomes, such as a reduction in 
11
Synthesis Report
collaborative or alone. She also noted that good research 
was necessary to flag any issues. She raised concerns 
that many commercial research providers offer back-
ward-looking research, and often the data are outdated.
Francesca Maritati (EIB) explained EIB’s holistic ap-
proach to ESG considerations, with a priority on climate 
and environment in infrastructure projects and a focus 
on SMEs and mid-cap firms. She noted that, although 
evidence shows that sustainable companies outperform 
others, based on ESG ratings, there is little insight into the 
tradeoff between E&S and G. She also encouraged the 
researchers to do more work on ESG considerations on 
the value chain.
Conclusions, by Stijn Claessens
This past decade has seen a great deal of progress in 
research on corporate governance in emerging markets. 
More and better data have become available, and there is 
progress in methodologies. Researchers have approached 
corporate governance from a wider angle, and research 
on emerging markets is now truly worldwide. However, 
there is still a need to assure that research continues to 
improve and that research on individual countries is bet-
ter disseminated so as to share methodologies and, to the 
extent possible, generalize lessons. Also, while substantial 
reforms have taken place in many (developing) countries, 
the outcome of these reforms has not yet been fully cap-
tured by academic research. This is most efficiently done 
by building global links, encouraging research collabora-
tion, and facilitating outreach. 
The evolving structure and governance of the Network is 
aimed at these goals. The Network is now more of a joint 
undertaking of corporate governance research centers 
with internationally recognized scholars. The model is a 
virtual hub, with several regional nodes of key institu-
tions involved in corporate governance research, which in 
turn connect to other centers in their respective regions. 
Corporate governance advocacy centers are expected to 
be collaborating with and supporting the research centers 
in the proposed model.
Some corporate governance topics could occupy more 
panel data from 151 companies listed on the Vietnam 
Stock Exchange over 2007–2016, the authors examined the 
potential impact of board independence on firm risk. The 
paper shows that the relationship between the proportion 
of non-executive directors and stock return volatility may 
be moderated by the level of corporate capital expenditures. 
The authors report that the presence of non-executive di-
rectors on boards increases firm risk; however, the combi-
nation of non-executive ratio and capital expenditure ratio 
has a significant negative impact on firm risk. Firms with 
excessive capital expenditures tend to urge non-executive 
directors to increase supervision to reduce risks.
Discussant Diana Pop (University of Angers) noted that 
the empirical strategy does not address the causal inference 
between governance and outcome variables. She suggest-
ed that the authors should identify treated firms against a 
control group with firms that already had non-executive 
directors before the new ruling.
Special Session: “Science Meet Practice: Contemporary 
Investor Dilemmas When Implementing E, S, and G in 
Emerging Markets”
Rounding out the research conference were presentations/
discussions with representatives of the European Invest-
ment Bank, NN-Investment Partners, and IFC.
Alexey Volynets (IFC) noted that the research on the perfor-
mance outcome of sustainability is often of limited use for 
practitioners, because sustainability is operationalized by 
adding scores of environmental and social (E&S) and gov-
ernance (G) factors together as the independent variable. 
He added that we need to see evidence that implementing 
ESG together, as an integrated approach, is better than 
addressing E&S and G separately. Based on IFC’s experi-
ence, he said, the impact of its work on E&S factors with 
companies may remain limited if these issues are not on the 
agenda of the top management or the board. He concluded 
by asking the researchers to present evidence that an inte-
grated approach to ESG relates to better performance. 
Faryda Lindeman (NN Investments Partners) focused her 
presentation on being an active owner. She said sharehold-
ers need to use their influence to effectuate change, and en-
gagement is a powerful and effective tool for this—whether 
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and stakeholders, which includes the role of corporate 
governance for environmental performance as well as other 
social concerns, including poverty and inequality, where 
more work would be very valuable.
research and general analysis. Two topics this conference 
is highlighting are “The Role of Corporate Social Respon-
sibility” and “Green Financing.” These themes should be 
put under the general heading of corporate governance 
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